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Abstract
We experimentally test the social motives behind individual participation in intergroup conflict
by manipulating the perceived target of threat—groups or individuals—and the symmetry of con-
flict. We find that behavior in conflict depends on whether one is harmed by actions perpetrated
by the out-group, but not on one’s own influence on the outcome of the out-group. The perceived
target of threat dramatically alters decisions to participate in conflict. When people perceive their
group to be under threat, they are mobilized to do what is good for the group and contribute to the
conflict. On the other hand, if people perceive to be personally under threat, they are driven to do
what is good for themselves and withhold their contribution. The first phenomenon is attributed
to group identity, possibly combined with a concern for social welfare. The second phenomenon
is attributed to a novel victim effect. Another social motive—reciprocity—is ruled out by the data.
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Social identity informs and shapes individual and social behavior (Akerlof and Kranton, 2011). Recent de-
velopments in economics promote the notion that identity is arguably more important than the monetary
incentives that take center stage in standard theory. Besley and Ghatak (2003, 2005) argued that organiza-
tions can more effectively enhance worker motivation and effort by matching the organization mission to
the workers’ preferences. Akerlof and Kranton (2005, 2008, 2011) take a more general view and regard the
mission as one of many ways to foster an insider identity in the worker. An insider adopts the organizational
affiliation as part of her social identity, and the organization’s objective as her own. In this view, rather than
relying on optimal pecuniary contracts, “the success of an organization depends on employees who share its
goals” (Akerlof and Kranton, 2011, p. 58).
Social, or group, identity facilitates cooperation within groups. Kramer and Brewer (1984) found that
priming a joint community identity rather than a subordinate divisive social identity increased cooperation in
a common resource pool dilemma. Similarly, inducing common fate by determining part of the experimental
payoff by a randommechanism at the group or at a subordinate level increases cooperation in social dilemmas
(Brewer and Kramer, 1986; Kramer and Brewer, 1984; Wit and Wilke, 1992). Eckel and Grossman (2005)
artificially enhanced group identity incrementally, from using arbitrary labels to participation in a collabo-
rative task and group competition, to find that strong manipulations increase contributions to a group public
good. Similarly, Charness et al. (2007) created artificial groups to show that the saliency of the group affects
individual behavior, increasing within-group and reducing between-group cooperation. In Chowdhury et al.
(2015), participants invested more in a between-group Tullock contest when informed that the experimental
groups are based on existing ethnic groups.
These studies—while clearly placing group identity at the heart of economic behavior—provide only a
limited understanding of how group identity emerges. Akerlof and Kranton (2005, 2011) assert that firms
should be willing to invest in creating ‘insider’ identities for their employees, and review and discuss sug-
gestive evidence on how the military, firms, and political parties can influence social categories.1 These
include training, tight interactions within the group, and explicitly stated organizational norms. In this paper,
we draw on the vast knowledge accrued in psychology, sociology, and political science on the role of inter-
group conflict in breeding group identity and thus cooperation (Campbell, 1965; Coser, 1956; Sherif, 1961;
Stein, 1976). For example, pro-social behaviors directed at the group increase during times of war (Glynn
et al., 2003; Gneezy and Fessler, 2012; Janis, 1951; Penner et al., 2005; Schmiedeberg, 1942; Steinberg and
Rooney, 2005).2 Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) places intergroup conflict as the first and
obvious determinant of social identity. Conflict with other groups creates a clear distinction between the
groups, which is required to establish a collective identity. Moreover, conflict induces a common fate within
the group, as the actions of the competing group affect the in-group as a whole.
1See also Ellemers et al. (2004) for an analysis of the interplay between identity and work motivation.
2On the evolution of intragroup cooperation with intergroup conflict, see Bowles (2008); Bowles et al. (2003); Choi and Bowles
(2007); Guzmán et al. (2007); Hugh-Jones and Zultan (2013).
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We use a controlled experiment to study the necessary conditions for intergroup conflict to trigger group
identity-mediated cooperation. The experimental data lead us to draw two main conclusions. First, it is
the threat that another group (the outgroup) poses to one’s group, as opposed to having the opportunity to
harm the other group, that fosters cooperation within the group. Second, for group identity and cooperation
to emerge in conflict, it is crucial that the group, rather than individual group members, is perceived to be
under threat. When the objectively same threat is perceived as imposed separately on the individual group
members, they are less likely to cooperate.
Our workhorse is the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD; Bornstein, 1992; Bornstein and Ben-Yossef,
1994), which embeds a standard Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game in intergroup conflict. In our experimental
PD game, each of three players in the group receives an initial endowment of 140 ECU (Experimental Cur-
rency Units) and decides whether to contribute to a group account or not. Contribution carries a cost of 50
ECU and increases the payoff of each of the three group members (including the contributor) by 30 ECU (the
contributor’s net loss is thus 20 ECU). The IPD game maintains this payoff structure within the group. The
gain of the in-group members, however, is at the expense of members of a matched group. Put differently,
in the PD payoffs are based only on the sum of contributions in the group, while in the IPD payoffs increase
with the sum of contributions in the group, and decrease with the sum of contributions in the matched group.
In a pioneer study, Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) found that cooperation levels in the IPDwere roughly
double those in the PD.Why does intergroup conflict facilitate intragroup cooperation, despite the severe neg-
ative effect that cooperation has on the outgroup? From the point of view of an individual player, embedding
the social dilemma within the group conflict adds two aspects to the game. First, her group is placed under
threat of being harmed by contributions in the out-group. Second, her own contributions harm the mem-
bers of the out-group. While these two aspects are confounded in the IPD, only the first implies common
fate. We disentangle these two aspects by introducing a new game, the Asymmetric Intergroup Prisoner’s
Dilemma (AIPD). In the AIPD, contributions made by members of one group—which we label the Attacker
group—increase the payoffs of the group’s members and decrease the payoffs of members of the other group,
as in the IPD. In contrast, contributions made by members of the other group—which we label the Victim
group—only affect payoffs within that group, as in the PD. In other words, the payoff function of Attacker
group members are determined as in the PD (i.e., they are not affected by the out-group); and the payoffs of
members of the Victim group are determined as in the IPD (i.e., they are affected by the out-group).
If common fate is the crucial aspect that triggers group identity and consequently cooperation, we should
observe more cooperation, relative to a PD game, in the Victim group, but not in the Attacker group, as only
members of the former share a common fate due to the actions of the other group. If intergroup conflict
enhances group identity, at least to some extent, through creating a clear group boundary with respect to
another group, we should also observe an effect in the Attacker group.3
Group identity, however, is not the only social motive involved in group conflict. Reciprocity, for example,
3De Dreu et al. (2015) similarly used an asymmetric predator-prey game to disentangle motives. In their game, the prey/victim—but
not the predator/attacker—is exposed to a fear motive, similar to the way in which the victims in our game, but not attackers, share a
common fate.
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has been shown to drive behavior across many social interactions (Fehr and Gächter, 2000).4 The high level
of contributions in the IPD can accordingly be explained as the manifestation of negative reciprocity between
individuals belonging to opposing groups. In the appendix we develop a model based on Rabin (1993) that
incorporates reciprocal preferences into individuals’ utility functions and shows that, consequently, expected
contribution levels are higher in the IPD than in the PD.
Another important social motive that emerges from the experimental and behavioral literature is a taste
for maximizing social welfare or efficiency. In many cases, people are willing to incur a small personal cost
if it results in a larger benefit to others (e.g., Charness and Rabin, 2002; Choshen-Hillel and Yaniv, 2011;
Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Kritikos and Bolle, 2001).5 Perhaps somewhat oddly, the opposite is observed
in the context of intergroup conflict, where contributions are higher in the less efficient IPD (where it is nec-
essary to harm the out-group in order to benefit the in-group) in comparison with the PD (where the in-group
benefit does not entail harming the out-group). Nonetheless, preferences for social welfare maximization can
explain another result in the context of group conflict. In the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma-Maximizing
Differences game (IPD-MD; Halevy et al., 2008), players who wish to contribute in order to increase the
payoff of their in-group can allocate their contribution between two pools. Contributions to a within-group
pool do not (negatively) affect the payoff of the out-group, as in the PD, whereas contributions to a between-
group pool do, as in the IPD. Several experiments found that contributions to the inefficient between-group
pool are substantially lower than contributions to the efficient within-group pool, suggesting a concern for
the welfare of outgroup members (De Dreu et al., 2010; Halevy et al., 2008, 2012; Weisel and Böhm, 2015).
Why do people tend to engage in conflict in the IPD game of Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994), but
choose to avoid conflict in the IPD-MD game of Halevy et al. (2008)? We see three possible explanations.
The explanation put forward by Halevy et al. (2008) is that group identity induced by conflict fosters in-group
love but not out-group hate, such that people have no particular interest in harming the out-group unless it is
essential for helping the in-group (as is the case in the IPD). Another possible explanation is that people have
a preference for social welfare maximization, which is not apparent in the IPD due to the stronger effects
of group identity. In the IPD-MD, however, this preference induces aversion to the between-group pool,
as individuals can satisfy both their desire to benefit in-group members and to increase social welfare by
directing their contributions at the within-group pool.
A third explanation for the discrepancy between the two types of studies hangs on theway inwhich conflict
was presented, and as a result, perceived by group members. In the experiments that found higher contri-
butions in the IPD than in the PD, the payoffs were presented to participants as a function of the difference
between the total contributions made by the members of the two groups. In other words, the comparison
4In the one-shot simultaneous games that we study, players are not able to reciprocate observed actions by others. We nonetheless
use the term reciprocity to describe reciprocal preferences that sustain cooperation in equilibrium when actions are taken to reciprocate
expected actions by others. A static equilibrium notion based on a ‘principle of reciprocity’ was offered by Sugden (1984). Fischbacher
and Gächter (2010) have argued, based on experimental evidence, that people choose their contribution to a public good as if they
reciprocate the contributions they expect others to make.
5In this paper we do not distinguish between concern for efficiency—maximizing aggregate payoffs—and for social welfare—
maximizing aggregate utilities—since both notions are essentially equivalent in the conflict games that we study.
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Table 1: Effects of social motives on contribution
Social motive PD IPD Attacker Victim
Group identity − + − +
Reciprocity − + − −
Social welfare + − − +
Note: The "+" signs indicate that the social motive (row) is hy-
pothesized to increase contributions in the respective game/group
type (column).
between the two groups was made salient (see Table 3 and the instructions for the Comparison Frame in
the online appendix). The experiments on the IPD-MD, in comparison, distinguished in their experimental
instructions between the direct effects of individual contributions on in- and out-group members, without
explicitly comparing contributions in the two groups (see the instructions for the Individual Harm Frame in
the online appendix). In fact, no published study has hitherto compared contributions in the PD and the IPD
using the same presentation that was used in the IPD-MD studies. The current study remedies this situation.
Aims and hypotheses
Our aim in this paper is twofold. First, we wish to identify the unique effects of group identity, reciprocity,
and social welfare considerations (henceforth GI, REC, and SW, respectively) on cooperation in intergroup
conflict. This is made possible by comparing the newAIPD game to the PD and IPD. The three social motives
diverge in their predictions with regard to contribution behavior in the different games. We accordingly draw
our main hypotheses, also summarized in Table 1:
Hypothesis 1. Group identity: Cooperation is higher in the IPD and in the Victim group, in which group
members share a common fate due to the joint effect of contributions in the out-group on their payoff.
Hypothesis 2. Reciprocity: Cooperation is higher in the IPD, in which there is a reciprocal relationship
between the two groups.
Hypothesis 3. Social welfare: Cooperation is higher in the PD and the Victim group, in which contribu-
tions do not have a negative effect on out-group members.
These hypotheses can be combined to generate new predictions for combinations of any two motives.
Table 2 summarizes the different theoretical predictions.6
Second, we compare different ways in which the experimental game of conflict has been presented in
previous experiments to determine how perceptions of the nature of the conflict affect behavior, and how
6The qualitative prediction of a combination of all three motives cannot be distinguished from that of a combination of just GI and
SW due to the conflicting effects in the IPD.
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Table 2: Predicted contribution levels for different social motives
Social motive(s) Predicted contribution levels
GI IPD = V ictim > PD = Attacker
REC IPD > V ictim = PD = Attacker
SW V ictim = PD > IPD = Attacker
GI & REC IPD > V ictim > PD = Attacker
GI & SW V ictim > IPD >=< PD > Attacker
REC & SW IPD >=< PD = V ictim > Attacker
Notes: Contributions in different games are assumed to be identical when the same set of social motives
applies ("="); contributions in a given game are assumed to be higher than in another when the relevant social
motives in the latter are a (proper) subset of those in the former (">"); we do not assume anything about the
relative effect of different social motives on contributions (">=<").
these perception interact with GI, REC, and SW. Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) used what we refer to as a
Comparison frame to describe the payoffs in the IPD, and found more cooperation in the IPD as compared to
the PD. Under a Comparison frame, payoffs in the PD are determined by a player’s choice (to contribute or
not) and the number of contributions in the group, and payoffs in the IPD are determined by a player’s choice
and the difference in the number of contributors between her group and the other group, as in Table 3. In
contrast, Halevy et al. (2008) used an Individual Harm frame and found that people refrain from contributing
to an IPD-type pool. In an Individual Harm frame the payoffs are determined by the direct externalities
(negative or positive) that individual contribution has on members of the two groups.
We manipulate the framing to explicitly test whether contributions in the IPD depend on how the game is
presented. To explain the existing results, we conjecture that the Comparison frame, in which the actions and
payoffs are presented at the group level, induces an increased sense of common fate, which triggers group
identity. Furthermore, in the Individual Harm frame, in which actions and payoffs are presented at the indi-
vidual level, the harm inflicted on out-group members is brought to the fore and social welfare considerations
are more pronounced. The latter prediction is rooted in the principle that “When people are seen as individ-
uals rather than as members of a group, the desire to hurt them for the sake of beating them may be reduced
because of greater empathy or identification” (Baron, 2012, pp. 218–219). Our next hypotheses reflect this
conjecture.
Hypothesis 4a. Comparison frame: The effects of group identity described in Hypothesis 1 are stronger
under the Comparison frame.
Hypothesis 4b. Individual Harm frame: The effects of social welfare maximization described in Hypoth-
esis 3 are stronger under the Individual Harm frame.
The effects of conflict on cooperation depend on individual characteristics. For example, Probst et al.
(1999) found that contributions in the IPD are either higher or lower than in the PD, depending on individually
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held cultural values. To account for individual differences, we measure participants’ social value orientation
(SVO; Liebrand and McClintock, 1988; Van Lange, 1999) using the slider measure (Murphy et al., 2011);
and their willingness to punish by eliciting minimum acceptable offers (MAO) in an ultimatum game. SVO
increases with the willingness to forgo a personal payoff in order to increase others’ welfare, hence, it is
expected to be correlated with concern for SW. GI is also a pro-social tendency, and is therefore expected
to be moderated by SVO. REC, on the other hand, is conceptually orthogonal to SVO, and is expected to
be correlated with the willingness to retaliate in the ultimatum game. Accordingly, we draw the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 5a. Social value orientation and SW: The effects of social welfare maximization described
in Hypothesis 3 are stronger as SVO increases.
Hypothesis 5b. Social value orientation and GI: The effects of group identity described in Hypothesis 1
are stronger as SVO increases.
Hypothesis 6. Retaliation: Participants who are more willing to reject low offers in the ultimatum game
are more likely to contribute (only) in the IPD.
Experimental design and procedure
The computerized experiment was conducted at the experimental economics lab in Jena and programmed in
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Four hundred and forty four participants were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner,
2015). Sessions lasted approximately one hour, and the average payoff was 15e, including a showup fee
of 2.50e.
Each experimental session included three stages comprised of the conflict game (PD, IPD, or AIPD),
presented in either a Comparison or an Individual Harm frame, an ultimatum game, and the SVO slider mea-
sure. The participants were informed at the beginning of the experiment that there will be three independent
stages, but not of their content.
The conflict game (stage 1)
We manipulated group type and the way conflict is framed (presented) in a 2 x 4 between-subjects design
with group type (PD / IPD / Attacker / Victim) and framing (Comparison / Individual Harm) as independent
variables. At the beginning of the stage, participants were randomly allocated to pairs of three-person groups.
The groups in each pair were labeled Group A and Group B. Each groupmember was endowed with 140 ECU
(Experimental Currency Unit). Contribution carried a fixed cost of 50 ECU and increased the payoff of each
group member, including the contributor, by 30 ECU. Contributions made in the IPD and by the Attacker
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Table 3: Payoff tables in the Comparison frame
(a) PD and Attacker payoffs
contributions in the group 0 1 2 3
Contribute - 120 150 180
Not contribute 140 170 200 -
(b) IPD and Victim payoffs
Contributions in the group minus -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3contribution in the other group
Contribute - 30 60 90 120 150 180
Not contribute 50 80 110 140 170 200 -
group in the AIPD additionally reduced the payoff of each out-group member by 30 ECU.7 Accordingly, the
payoff function for participants in the PD and in the Attacker group was




where ci ∈ {0, 1} is i’s contribution decision and I denotes i’s in-group. The corresponding payoff function
for participants in the IPD and in the Victim group was







where O denotes i’s outgroup.
The instructions in the Individual Harm frame explained the direct effect of contribution on the contribu-
tor, her in-group members and her out-group members. The instructions in the Comparison frame treatments
presented the game payoffs in tables following Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994).8 In the PD and Attacker
groups, the payoffs were presented as a function of the number of contributors in the group and the individ-
ual decision. In the IPD and Victim groups, the payoff was presented as a function of the difference in the
number of contributors between the in-group and the out-group and of the individual decision (to contribute
or not). Table 3 reproduces the payoff tables shown to participants. The instructions for the PD and IPD
sessions included and explained the relevant payoff table. Instructions for the AIPD sessions included both
payoff tables.
7To keep the instructions identical across treatments and to control for the mere existence of another group, the instructions in the
PD also referred to Group A and Group B.
8See the appendix for an English translation of the instructions. The German original is available upon request.
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In all treatments, the explanation of the payoff structure was followed by a detailed example. Participants
indicated that they understood the instructions and were then required to correctly calculate their payoff in
two hypothetical situations before the experiment proceeded.
Next, participants made their contribution decisions, after which they were asked to guess how many
members of their in-group and their out-group chose to contribute. Guesses were not incentivized. This
concluded the first stage.
The Ultimatum game (stage 2)
In the second stage, participants played a strategy-method ultimatum game (UG), in which each player played
both as a responder and as a proposer. First, each participant i played the role of the responder in the UG by
indicating the “minimum acceptable offer” (MAO) in ECU, ri ∈ {10, 20, ...190}.9 Second, each participant
made a decision in the role of the proposer in the UG and suggested a division of 200 ECU between herself
and her partner j by selecting pi ∈ {10, 20, ...190} ECU for herself, with the rest, 200 − pi, going to the
partner. Participants were randomly paired and the payoff relevant roles were determined randomly, with one
member of the pair as a proposer and the other as a responder. If the proposer’s (i) division was accepted by
the responder (j), i.e., 200 − pi ≥ rj , the proposer received pi ECU and the responder received 200 − pi
ECU. If it was rejected, i.e., 200− pi < rj , then both the proposer and the responder received nothing.
The instructions for the second stage explained the rules of the UG, the way participants were paired and
selected to the roles of proposer or repeonder, and included an example for illustration. Participants indicated
that they understood the instructions and then proceeded to make their decisions.
The Social Value Orientation slider measure (stage 3)
In the third and final stage participants completed the Social Value Orientation slider measure (Murphy et al.,
2011). In this measure, which aims to measure the magnitude of the concern people have for others, each
participant makes a series of 15 dictator decisions. In each decision, the participant chooses one of nine
possible allocations. Choices are then aggregated to determine a unique value for each participant, expressed
as an angle on a self/other two-dimensional space. A value of zero indicates perfect selfishness. Higher
values indicate stronger regard to the payoff of others.
After deciding on their allocations, participants were randomly matched in pairs to determine the payoff
in this stage. One participant in each pair was randomly chosen to be the allocator, and one randomly selected
decision of that participant determined the payoff for both participants in the pair.
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Table 4: Logistic regressions on the probability of contribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Comparison Individual
Harm
All data all data
IPD 0.139 0.139 1.314*
(0.373) (0.373) (0.771)
Victim 0.898** 0.898** 2.413***
(0.397) (0.397) (0.872)
Attacker -0.0354 -0.0354 0.655
(0.399) (0.399) (0.778)
Individual Harm 0.139 2.128***
(0.373) (0.802)
Individual Harm x IPD -0.916** -1.055* -2.781**
(0.419) (0.561) (1.172)
Individual Harm x Victim -0.693* -1.591*** -4.125***
(0.399) (0.563) (1.247)




IPD x SVO 0.0520*
(0.0294)
Victim x SVO 0.0663**
(0.0326)
Attacker x SVO 0.0322
(0.0321)
Individual Harm x SVO 0.0910***
(0.0318)
Individual Harm x IPD x SVO -0.0782
(0.0483)
Individual Harm x Victim x SVO -0.118**
(0.0478)
Individual Harm x Attacker x SVO -0.0837*
(0.0457)
Constant -0.475* -0.336 -0.475* -0.917
(0.266) (0.262) (0.266) (0.570)
N 216 228 444 444
















































Note: error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 1: Proportions of contributors
Results
Figure 1 presents the proportions of participants contributing in the different treatments, for all participants
(Panel 1a) and for pro-social participants only (Panel 1b).10 Table 4 presents the results of a series of logistic
regressions taking the probability of contribution as the dependent variable. Columns (1) and (2) describe
separate models for the two frames. Column (3) presents an aggregate model, and Column (4) adds the SVO
and its interactions.11 The MAO data collected in the ultimatum game of Stage 2 did not predict behavior
in the conflict games and are therefore omitted from the analysis. Because the results are markedly different
between the Comparison frame and the Individual Harm frame, we describe the results separately for each.
9We also asked participants what is the maximal amount they wish to reject, to ensure proper understanding.
10Individuals are classified as pro-social according to the criterion in Murphy et al. (2011).
11Since the SVO elicitation followed the conflict game decisions, it is possible that the allocation decisions in the later stage were
affected by the specific game encountered in the early stage. However, a model comparing SVO across group types and frames is not
overall significant (F (7, 436) = 1.37, p = 0.218). From all 28 possible pairwise comparisons, none are significant when applying a
Bonferroni correction. Even without correcting for multiple comparisons, only three pairwise comparisons are significant at the 0.05
level, as a result from the mean SVO being relatively high in the Attacker group under the Comparison frame (26.5 vs. 19.3–23.3 in
the other seven cells), a treatment in which the SVO was not significantly correlated with contributions in the conflict game, and which
bears little on the conclusions.
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Comparison frame
Contribution levels were significantly higher in the Victim group (60.4%) than in the PD (38.3%, z =
2.50, p = 0.012), the IPD (41.7%, z = 1.99, p = 0.047), and Attacker (37.5%, z = 2.45, p = 0.014) groups,
which were not significantly different from each other (p > 0.500 for all three pairwise comparisons).12 The
high proportion of contributors in the Victim group, in particular when compared to our baseline PD treat-
ment, is in line with Hypothesis 1 (Group Identity). Recall that group identity was originally invoked to
explain the high contributions in the IPD game observed by Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994), a pattern not
replicated in our data. Thus, the lack of a significant difference between the PD and IPD treatments deviates
both from previous findings and from the predictions of Hypothesis 1.
Nonetheless, these deviations can be accounted for when considering the interactions of the treatments
with the SVO measure presented in Column (4) in Table 4. We see that participants who score high on
the SVO measure are more likely to contribute in the IPD than in the PD, as in Bornstein and Ben-Yossef
(1994).13 The fact that the behavior observed by Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) was similar to the behavior
we observe in highly pro-social participants suggests that social value orientation moderates the tendency to
contribute more in the IPD than in the PD. Social value orientation was not measured in Bornstein and Ben-
Yossef (1994), but since their sample differed from ours in generation (1990’s vs. 2010’s), country (Israel
vs. Germany), and recruitment procedures—which can affect the proportion of pro-social individuals that
are selected to participate (see, e.g., Krawczyk, 2011)—it is plausible that pro-sociality levels were higher.
Individual contributions to conflict, therefore, can be viewed as a manifestation of pro-social tendencies.
This interpretation is consistent with the view that human altruism, as manifested in high pro-sociality, is
inherently parochial and rooted in intergroup conflict, which gains theoretical support from evolutionary
models and simulations (Bowles, 2008; Choi and Bowles, 2007), as well as empirical support from hormonal
studies (De Dreu, 2012; De Dreu et al., 2011).
The test of Hypothesis 5b further supports group identity as the main motive driving behavior in the
Comparison frame. As can be seen in Figure 1b, pro-socials contribute significantly more in the IPD and
Victim group, in which intergroup conflict instills common fate. This result is supported by the regression
presented in Column (4) of Table 4, which provides the treatment coefficients estimated for purely pro-social
participants.14
If group identity is the only social motive at play, we would expect to observe the same levels of contri-
12Pairwise z- and p-values were computed based on model (4) in table 4.
13A similar dependence on individual types was previously observed by Probst et al. (1999), who found higher contributions in the IPD
compared to the PD only for vertical individualists, classified as participants that agree with competitive statements such as ‘competition
is the law of nature’ and ‘winning is everything’ (Probst et al., 1999; Singelis et al., 1995).
14No significant effects were found for participants categorized as pro-self and for the model estimates at SVO=0◦, representing purely
selfish individuals. Interpreting the SVO as reflecting a-priori preferences, as we do here, is not necessary for our conclusion. Even
if contributions in the conflict game influenced the allocation choices used to estimate the SVO—somewhat unlikely, as the principle
of moral balancing (Nisan, 1990, 1991) would predict a negative, rather than a positive, correlation—the fact that this only happens
in the treatments associated with enhanced group identity due to common fate equally speaks for the importance of group identity in
determining behavior in intergroup conflict.
12
butions in the IPD and in the Victim group, as both experience common fate due to the out-group’s actions.
The difference between the two groups can be explained by a concern for social welfare. That is, if we restrict
ourselves to the PD, IPD, and Victim groups, the results are perfectly in line with a combination of GI and
SW (cf. Table 2).15 Behavior in the Attacker group is not in line with this explanation, however, as contri-
butions are not significantly lower than in the PD and the IPD as would be predicted according to SW. This
disparity can be explained in two ways. One is that members of the Attacker group, unlike players in the IPD,
completely ignore the other group as it does not affect them, hence social welfare considerations do not enter
their decision. Another possible explanation is that although the members of the attacker group do not share a
common fate in the sense that it exists in the IPD and in the Victim group, they do experience enhanced group
identity due to having a dependent, strategically linked, out-group. This explanation, although sufficient to
fully explain the contribution patterns in the Comparison frame, does not explain why contributions in the
Attacker group are not moderated by pro-sociality and are not sensitive to the framing of the game (as will be
discussed below), two factors that theoretically and empirically should moderate group identity. Therefore,
to the extent that group identity is promoted by having a strategically-linked out-group (as in the Attacker
group), this effect is separate from the group identity effect that emerges from sharing a common fate (as in
the IPD and Victim group), which is moderated by pro-sociality and the way conflict is framed.
In sum, we conclude that when intergroup conflict involves a comparison between groups, it triggers
group identity due to common fate and, possibly, also due to imposing a common fate on another group. We
find indirect evidence for the existence of social welfare concerns that mitigate the effects of group identity
in bilateral conflict. Reciprocity in the sense of retaliation against expected hostilities does not appear to play
a role in participation in conflict.
Individual Harm frame
The perceived target of threat has a stark effect on behavior. While conflict had a weak positive effect on
cooperation within the group in the Comparison frame (i.e., slightly more cooperation in IPD relative to
PD; significantly more for pro-socials), conflict framed as Individual Harm had the opposite (!) effect, with
cooperation levels dropping sharply from 41.7% in the PD to 22.2% in the IPD (z = 2.18, p = 0.029).
Furthermore, the interactions with SVO follow a different pattern from that observed in the Comparison
frame, as high SVO scores in the Individual Harm frame are associated with higher contribution rates only
in the PD (and not in the IPD and Victim group), and do not affect the overall contribution pattern.
The Individual Harm framing boosts the saliency of the adverse effect of contributions on out-group
members as well as the fact that there is no overall social gain from contributions. According to our hy-
potheses, the results in the PD and the IPD support a social welfare maximization motive. However, SW
and its combinations with any of the other two motives predict that cooperation in the Attacker group would
15Note, however, that the data in the Individual Harm frame, discussed below, strongly rejects the existence of social welfare consid-
erations. As our ex-ante Hypothesis 4b predicted that social welfare plays a larger role in the Individual Harm frame, it is not clear that
it indeed comes into play in the Comparison frame.
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be lower than in the other groups (in particular, lower than the Victim group) and cooperation in the Victim
group would be at least as high as in the PD (cf. Table 2). The pattern evident in the results is quite the op-
posite, with low cooperation levels evident in the Victim (26.3%) rather than in the Attacker group (43.9%).
Thus, including the AIPD game in our design allows us to reject all three social motives as driving behavior
under the Individual Harm frame. Rather, we find that being exposed to Individual Harm inflicted by mem-
bers of another group led people to withdraw their contribution to the in-group. We conclude that perceiving
conflict as a threat to one’s self triggers selfishness and leads to low contribution rates. We elaborate on this
conclusion in the next section.
Discussion and conclusion
The literature on within-group cooperation and collective action in conflict has so far focused on group iden-
tity as the main mediator of the effects of intergroup conflict on intra-group cooperation. The behavioral
literature led us to hypothesize that collective action in conflict is also driven by (negative) reciprocity be-
tween members of opposing groups. Additionally, we hypothesized that these effects mask a negative effect
of social welfare maximization on cooperation in conflict.
The experiment reported in this paper explicitly tested these three hypotheses by introducing the Asym-
metric Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (AIPD). Our framing manipulation varied whether the harm inflicted
by contributions in the out-group (in-group) is targeted jointly at all members of the in-group (out-group)
or separately at each individual. Our results can be summed by the following principle, which we term the
Perceived Target of Threat Principle:
When people perceive their group to be under threat, they are mobilized to do what is good for
the group and contribute to the conflict. On the other hand, when people perceive themselves to
be personally under threat, they are driven to do what is good for themselves and withhold their
contribution.
These effects are apparent in the two treatments that involve being harmed by contributions in the out-group,
namely the IPD and the Victim group. In line with the Perceived Target of Threat principle, contributions in
these treatments are significantly higher when the threat is presented at the group level than when the threat
is presented at the individual level. Thus, our paper contributes to the literature on subjective perceptions
of strategic situations and their effect on norm perception and behavior. In a scenario study by Tenbrunsel
and Messick (1999), for example, participants were significantly less likely to perceive a social dilemma as
an ethical decision situation if there was a small probability of being sanctioned for defecting. Accordingly,
cooperation levels were lower in the sanctioning treatment. A field study by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000)
similarly found a detrimental effect of sanctions on cooperative behavior, and similar framing effects were
found in ultimatum bargaining as well (e.g., Blount and Larrick, 2000).
In the Comparison frame, previously used in similar laboratory studies of the IPD game (e.g., Bornstein
14
and Ben-Yossef, 1994; Bornstein et al., 1996), Group identity provided the best explanation for observed
behavior in both symmetric and asymmetric conflict, lending support to Hypotheses 1, 4a, and 5b, which are
related to group identity. Studies of evolutionary dynamics argue that parochial altruism—the willingness to
sacrifice for one’s fellow group members—evolved as a response to intergroup conflict (Bowles, 2008; Choi
and Bowles, 2007). Our results support this view and identify the effect of common fate on group identity as
the underlying proximate mechanism.
In consideration of the alternative social motives invoked by the Comparison frame of intergroup con-
flict, comparing contributions in the IPD and in the Victim group served to ascertain the role of reciprocal
tendencies, as both group types include an element of common fate but differ with respect to the existence of
reciprocal relationships between the in-group and the out-group. The experimental results reject reciprocity
as an underlying motive, as contributions are higher in the Victim group, where contributions do not af-
fect out-group members and therefore there is no room for intergroup reciprocity. Thus, related Hypotheses
2 and 6 were not supported.
The evidence for social welfare maximization in the Comparison frame data is mixed. The markedly high
contribution rates in the Victim group, compared to the IPD, suggest that behavior is partially driven by a
concern for SW. Hence, the central Hypothesis 3 is partially supported. Related hypotheses 4b and 5a, which
predict the effects of SW to increase in the Individual Harm frame and with the SVO scores, respectively, do
not receive support from the data.
Our study of the Individual Harm framing of the conflict games reveals that the perceived target of threat
carries dramatic implications for the mobilization of individual group members in intergroup conflict. Com-
paring the PD and the IPD, and for pro-social individuals in particular, we find a strong interaction of the
framing and conflict. When individual payoffs in group conflict are presented as a result of a comparison
between groups—such that one’s group is perceived to be the target of threat—conflict increases contribu-
tions. Conversely, when the direct effects of in-group and out-group contributions on individual payoffs are
highlighted—such that the perceived target of threat is the individual—conflict reduces contributions. An
alternative way to think about this result is to consider how the way conflict is framed affects contribution
decisions. On the one hand, emphasizing the effects of contribution on individuals, as is the case in the
Individual Harm frame, leads pro-social individuals to contribute more in the PD, where contributions have
a positive effect on society. In contrast, the same framing leads to fewer contributions in the IPD, where
contributions carry a negative effect on (some) others and on overall social welfare. On the other hand, em-
phasizing the effect of contribution on the group, as in the Comparison frame, leads pro-social individuals
to contribute more in the IPD, where the positive effect of contribution for the group is congruent with the
frame.
In both presentations of the games, behavior in the IPD qualitatively resembles that in the Victim group,
but not in the Attacker group. In the Comparison frame, this pattern is predicted by group identity. In the
Individual Harm frame, however, none of the three social motives we considered ex-ante is able to explain this
pattern. Our interpretation is that we observe what we refer to as a Victim effect, referring to the tendency of
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individuals to behave selfishly when they perceive to be under personal threat. We consider this novel effect
to be a generalized principle of concern withdrawal. Charness and Rabin (2002) formulated the original
principle by arguing that “[subjects] withdraw their willingness to sacrifice to allocate the fair share toward
somebody who himself is unwilling to sacrifice for the sake of fairness” (p. 820). Our results suggest that
people’s unwillingness to sacrifice is not a result of misbehavior on the part of the potential beneficiary of
the sacrifice, but is rather a more egocentric reaction to being harmed or being exposed to harm.
Generalized concern withdrawal is linked to the notion of indirect reciprocity, and specifically to upstream
reciprocity, by which an individual who receives favorable treatment from another individual reciprocates by
treating a third individual favorably (Boyd and Richerson, 1989). Upstream reciprocity is evolutionary stable
in certain conditions, such as when interactions occur in small groups or when direct reciprocity is possible
(Nowak and Roch, 2007; Pfeiffer et al., 2005).
Several experimental studies found that people aremore likely to help others after being helped themselves
(Bartlett and DeSteno, 2006; Dufwenberg et al., 2001; Greiner and Levati, 2005; Güth et al., 2001). However,
unlike our experiment, these studies compared behavior conditional on the actual actions of others, whereas
our study compared different game structures. This difference allows us to extend the existing knowledge in
two important ways. First, the behavioral principle we identify is based on negative reciprocity, as in Charness
andRabin’s (2002) original formulation of concernwithdrawal. That is, out-group actions potentially affected
personal welfare in a negative way. Second, the factor that drives people behavior in our setup is not actual
harm, but mere exposure to potential harm.
The unexpected result under the Individual Harm frame raises two testable hypotheses: that concern
withdrawal is a special case of a general victim effect, and that exposure to harm has similar effects as actual
harm. Future research is needed to test and refine these hypotheses and their implications.
Our results also have significant implications for the study of in-group love and out-group hate as driving
motives in intergroup conflict (Brewer, 1999). Halevy et al. (2008) introduced the IPD-MD game as a way to
disentangle the two motives associated with group identity. The study of the IPD-MD game has established
that people refrain from harming out-group members when given an option to cooperate within the group
without affecting the out-group. Consequentially, enhanced group identity as a result of intergroup conflict
was considered to induce in-group love, but not out-group hate.
Studies of the IPD-MD game, however, relied exclusively on the Individual Harm frame. Given the
current results, which show that group identity does not seem to be invoked by conflict when the perceived
target of threat is the individual, it is not clear whether group identity induces in-group love, rather than out-
group hate—as per the interpretation of results obtained with the IPD-MD—or whether the way conflict was
framed did not induce group identity in the first place.
Whether out-group hate will emerge in the IPD-MDwhen the perceived target of threat is the group (e.g.,
using the Comparison frame) is up for future experiments to determine. One observation suggests a negative
answer to this question. In our experimental games, in-group love implies higher contributions in the IPD
and Victim groups, whereas out-group hate should only affect the IPD players. Since the positive effect of
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conflict on intra-group cooperation was primarily observed in the Victim group, in-group love appears to be
the major motive invoked by group identity.
Group identity plays a significant role in the life of individuals and organizations (Akerlof and Kranton,
2005; Charness et al., 2007; Chen and Li, 2009; Chowdhury et al., 2015). We conducted a controlled ex-
periment to establish that the effects of intergroup conflict and competition on intragroup cooperation are
mediated by group identity while controlling for other social motives. We find that group identity increases
cooperation when group members’ attention is focused on the risk born collectively by the group. When
attention is shifted to the personal risk sustained by each group member, however, group identity no longer
plays a role, and intergroup conflict inhibits, rather than facilitates, cooperation.
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